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A Tactical Ethic Moral Conduct in the Insurgent Battlespace Dick Couch 9781591141372 Books

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A Tactical Ethic Moral Conduct in the Insurgent Battlespace Dick Couch 9781591141372 Books

This book is on the some professional military reading lists. It should be but not at the top since it could be much better. It is a worthy subject since when the bullets start to fly we need all personnel ingrain with the proper ethic and professionalism. The author reminds us that ethic tool training should be integral to the normal training not a separate training event. For example, the author details a particular incident where a SEAL enter a room during a raid and was confronted with a man with a gun. Normally, the SEAL's muscle memory, from training, would guide him to turn, aim, and fire rapidly. However, there were non-combatants (family) behind the man. Since the man was in reach of his weapon, he chose another option of using the barrel of his rifle to knock him out. Although we will never have all Soldiers train to the level of a SEAL, we can train them with ethics and muscle memory to do the right thing.

The book points out that we do train our personnel in ethics. Yes, military ethics are higher than the US baseline ethical standard even for non-combat arms Soldiers. The problem in most ethical failures is leadership not identify and changing / removing the Soldiers with poor ethics. These persons will infect and turn an unit into one that will commit crimes. These influencers will cause others to commit acts they may normally not do.

Overall, the book is good but could be better. The book could have reviewed latest incidents for their causes as a reinforcement to the thesis that poor leadership with the infection of morally deficient persons destroys unit ethical behavior. Otherwise, this is a long article on an important subject by worthy author and Sailor.


Tags : A Tactical Ethic: Moral Conduct in the Insurgent Battlespace [Dick Couch] on Amazon.com. *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. Following the success of his recent book on Navy SEALs in Iraq, The Sheriff of Ramadi</i>, bestselling author and combat veteran Dick Couch now examines the importance of battlefield ethics in effectively combating terrorists without losing the battle for the hearts of the local population. A former SEAL who led one of the only successful POW rescue operations in Vietnam,Dick Couch,A Tactical Ethic: Moral Conduct in the Insurgent Battlespace,Naval Institute Press,1591141370,Military - Iraq War (2003-2011),Military - Naval,Military - United States,Military ethics,Military ethics.,War - Moral and ethical aspects,War;Moral and ethical aspects.,General Adult,HISTORY Military General,HISTORY Military Iraq War (2003-2011),HISTORY Military Naval,HISTORY Military United States,History,HistoryMilitary - Afghan War (2001-),HistoryMilitary - Iraq War (2003-2011),HistoryMilitary - Strategy,Military,Military - Afghan War (2001-),Military Science,Moral and ethical aspects,Non-Fiction,TECHNOLOGY & ENGINEERING Military Science,Technology & Industrial Arts,UNIVERSITY PRESS,United States,War,Warfare & defence

A Tactical Ethic Moral Conduct in the Insurgent Battlespace Dick Couch 9781591141372 Books Reviews

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Navy Captain (Retired) Dick Couch is especially well qualified to write a book on military ethics, not from a lawyer's perspective, but from the point of view of a leader and ethicist who has experienced combat first-hand. As a SEAL Team Platoon Commander in the Vietnam War, he led one of that conflict's few successful prisoner of war rescues. In 1997, he retired from the senior SEAL command billet in the Naval Reserves. Since then, he has served as the adjunct professor of ethics at the U.S. Naval Academy and as the ethics advisor to the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command.

It is no wonder then that, in "A Tactical Ethic Moral Conduct in the Insurgent Battlespace," Couch has succeeded in writing an extraordinarily insightful study of tactical military ethics. This is the guidebook on ethics that U.S. combat leaders, eager to keep their troops on the moral high ground, have been waiting for.

"A Tactical Ethic" begins powerfully, relating the story of a trainee who, in 2004, approached Couch at the Special Forces Qualification Course. This trainee, like the ancient mariner of Samuel Taylor Coleridge's rhyme, had a shameful tale to tell. In Afghanistan, this captain revealed, he had witnessed a special operations team beat to death an enemy prisoner of war. The captain said that he had tried to stop the assault, but soon gave up, feeling that if he pressed the issue, the incensed team might actually kill him, too.

Couch uses this story to introduce the question how much serious misconduct has gone unreported during the Global War on Terrorism? Couch's troubling answer is that, while the vast majority of U.S. troops behave honorably downrange, most incidents of misconduct are never reported.

Couch's conjecture is a scary thought, considering the number of tragic incidents that have been publicized. Thanks largely to the Internet and digital technology, such incidents gained the status of major military defeats. Historically, we have worried about setbacks on conventional battlefields, such as mass casualties at the Hurtgen Forest in World War II or the sudden appearance of Chinese divisions at the Yalu River in the Korean War. Of greater concern today, however, are lurid events at such places as Gitmo, Abu Ghraib, Bagram, Haditha, Kunduz, Mahmudiyah, and Al Qaim. To think that even more stories of recent U.S. military misconduct may be forthcoming is distressing, to say the least.

Couch is almost certainly right, though, since small units operate more independently and with less oversight on asymmetric battlefields. Also sobering is Couch's idea that the problem of battlefield misconduct is not something that can be corrected via top-down directives. As Couch indicates, U.S. military doctrine, regulations, and policy now largely address this problem. Still, battlefield misconduct--sometimes extremely serious misconduct--persists.

Couch argues that immoral subcultures reside in some small units within our operational military. According to Couch, these subcultures usually exist due to one or two influential moral "pirates" within a small unit. Such pirates commandeer a unit, using the strong ties of loyalty which bind members to one another to either convert other members to their cause or keep them quiet.

Why do moral pirates plague our operational military, despite the robust ethics-related education they received at initial military training? The answer to this question, Couch says, has a lot to do with an American pop culture that increasingly glorifies violence, which promotes a "win at any cost" mentality via "reality" programming, and which makes heroes of thugs like Jack Bauer. New recruits bring harmful values with them into military service, and without frequent and effective reinforcement training, the thin veneer of military values they acquire in initial training wears off. Amplifying the challenge for our military, Couch observes, is the tendency among so-called "millenials," the current generation of recruits, to try harder to "fit in" than the members of previous generations. Any American who has volunteered for military service has done so in part because he wants to be a valued member of a team. But millenials need to fit in even more than previous volunteers, increasing the likelihood that they will go along with an immoral small unit culture.

Couch presents two training models to assist us in defeating our moral pirates.

The first is that of the U.S. Marine Corps. Couch builds a convincing case that new Marines receive a stronger ethical imprint at boot camp than do other military service members during their initial training. Couch also points out that the U.S. Marine Corps does a better job of reinforcing ethics training than other services, largely powering down this responsibility to the small unit leaders who should own it. Despite Couch's assertions, though, there exists little published empirical evidence, such as psychological surveys or comparative studies of service misconduct, to support the idea that the U.S. Marine Corps has performed more ethically than other military services during the Global War on Terrorism. This may be due to counterbalancing weaknesses of the Marine Corps in other areas, such as a culture which can promote loyalty to fellow Marines at an excessive price (witness the revenge-motivated misconduct of Marines at Haditha and Shinwar). Still, certain strengths of the Marines' system may be worth emulating.

The second model, Couch says, is the Close Quarters Defense® System, a business that has been training special operators for two decades. The company excels at incorporating practical ethical decision making in its individual and team battle drills. Moreover, it takes the "train as you fight" idea one step further by preaching the virtue of the "complete warrior." Trainees are taught that living a balanced, moral life at home makes them far more effective warriors. If they love their country and their families, the company believes, they will fight at least as hard as their enemies on today's battlefields.

Whatever the ethics training model, Couch says, there are key rules this model will need to implement. These rules, which Couch calls his "Rules of Ethics," deserve to be read and digested by all military leaders. One especially important rule is "The Loyalty Rule"--loyalty before all else, except honor. "Small unit leaders," Couch says, "must make it unmistakably clear to their men that wrong action on the battlefield is a form of disloyalty--to their nation, to their service, to their team brothers, and to those fallen warriors whose honor they stain."

In the final analysis, "A Tactical Ethic" is not just an insightful study, it is a brave book. Pointing out that our military is not adequately addressing its deep cultural issues will not win Couch friends in certain quarters. Couch, who has written several popular works of history and fiction, clearly would not have written this book if he were not troubled by the current ethical state of our military. Thus, like the captain who told him the story of the murdered detainee, Couch has related a tale of which he, too, must unburden himself--the sad story of the inadequate state of ethics training today for most U.S. military service members.

Couch is right. We must do better. And reading "A Tactical Ethic" is a superb place for us to begin.

Douglas A. Pryer, Author, The Fight for the High Ground The U.S. Army and Interrogation During Operation Iraqi Freedom, May 2003 - April 2004
According to the Gallup Poll of June 1-4, 2006 (page 25)the military was the most trusted institution in America, with over a 70% approval rating. Number two were law enforcement officers with better than a 60% approval rating. The commander in chief, the President of the United States, had around 35%--and that is important because the military is under civilian control. Congress came in about 20%--Congress makes the rules that the military lives by and the Senate declares war.

Given this, "A Tactical Ethic" is still important enough to be shoved in a deployment bag as training refreshment when in the battle zone. America's military has been involved in irregular warfare even before there was a United States of America--the irregular conflict is the 'real war' for America's military. Dick Couch has a point--words and deeds must match. "We don't win insurgencies, we win the people..." (page 34/35)

Two issues what to do when the enemy won't play fair--and our warriors will be judged by our politicians after the victory. Our politicians grandstand--to put it mildly--and rack up political brownie points through persecution of the 'boots on the ground.'

Check on the results of the trials instigated by Congressman John Murtha regarding the Haditha killings. It's hard to be moral when the civilians that control the military are corrupt--John Murtha was a retired Marine Corps officer, too!

During the Chinese Civil War from 1911 to 1949 (with breaks to fight the Japanese during World War Two) Mao's Chinese Communists had a set of regulations that gave the Chinese Communists credibility for being the good guys. Never mind that torture and reprisals were the norm for all sides in that bloody war--compared to Chaing's warlords and their minions, the Chinese were paragons of virtue! Modern China is still paying the bill for that mere appearance of morality--but the other side of the coin was military necessity. It was a battle of terrorists--and one side was smart enough to balance the 'stick' with 'the carrot.' Unfortunate, but when Chaing was ejected from the mainland, there was no longer any reason to be moral.

Immediately after the American Civil War, the ex-slaves were granted the right to vote--and federal troops enforced that right until Congress outlawed such behavior. After that, the Ku Klux Klan stripped the vote from black Americans--America has had insurgencies since prior to the foundation of the Republic, not always on the side of the angels, either.

For America, there is every reason to continue ethical behavior even when the guideons are furled and the rifles racked in the armory. Last year's raid into 'friendly' Pakistan to capture or kill Osama bin Laden is being debated as to legality--and even the tactics the raiders used are being Monday Morning quarterbacked by the 'loyal opposition.'

Couch doesn't just preach ideals--he has practical recommendations for implimentation of a more ethical fighting force. Ethics are preached in the training commands, but (page 53) "Life in the training commands is NOT life in the operational units." The "real culture of the military" is described on pages 52-54 24/365 all-male, that the 'moral' needs improvement, and the 'ownership' aspect. My 27 year military career spanned 35 years and I found that the Rules of Engagement were poorly understood at all levels in the operational command. Rules of Engagement are the ethical and LEGAL limits of using force in the battlespace--a subset is the Use of Force rules. Rules of Engagement generally start with "upon declaration of hostilities, engage all identified enemy assets..." Use of Force rules are peacetime. Unfortunately, because the Rules of Engagement are not made "real" to the operational units in direct combat, because those rules appear to be modeled after the sporting rules governing football games or whatever, troops and junior leaders are apt to take 'shortcuts' that lead to My Lai.

The appendices include the moral creeds of all the armed services.

I didn't do justice to "A Tactical Ethic." There are two challenges not covered, challenges beyond the scope of the book--that our civilian leadership isn't held accountable to the same standard, and that the enemy will do whatever is thought to be a winning tactic.
This book is on the some professional military reading lists. It should be but not at the top since it could be much better. It is a worthy subject since when the bullets start to fly we need all personnel ingrain with the proper ethic and professionalism. The author reminds us that ethic tool training should be integral to the normal training not a separate training event. For example, the author details a particular incident where a SEAL enter a room during a raid and was confronted with a man with a gun. Normally, the SEAL's muscle memory, from training, would guide him to turn, aim, and fire rapidly. However, there were non-combatants (family) behind the man. Since the man was in reach of his weapon, he chose another option of using the barrel of his rifle to knock him out. Although we will never have all Soldiers train to the level of a SEAL, we can train them with ethics and muscle memory to do the right thing.

The book points out that we do train our personnel in ethics. Yes, military ethics are higher than the US baseline ethical standard even for non-combat arms Soldiers. The problem in most ethical failures is leadership not identify and changing / removing the Soldiers with poor ethics. These persons will infect and turn an unit into one that will commit crimes. These influencers will cause others to commit acts they may normally not do.

Overall, the book is good but could be better. The book could have reviewed latest incidents for their causes as a reinforcement to the thesis that poor leadership with the infection of morally deficient persons destroys unit ethical behavior. Otherwise, this is a long article on an important subject by worthy author and Sailor.